Introduction
Transport is a key sector in the environmental and energy security contexts. Member states of the European Union are highly dependent on imported transport fuels -in 2005 the oil dependency of the 27 member states of the European Union (EU-27) was 82.3% with more than two thirds of imports coming from the Middle East and Russia (EC 2008) . In the EU-27 transport is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) after the 5 energy generation sector (Eurostat 2008) . One notable exception is the transport sector, whose GHG emissions increased by 24% between 1990 and 2007.
Overall, the share of transport in total GHG emissions in the EU was 21% in 2007 not including aviation and shipping movements outside individual national borders which would increase this total by 30% (EC 2009).
When considering only transport within European borders, the share of road transport exceeds 90% of the direct 15 transport emissions (Eurostat 2009 ). Emissions from road transport have continued to grow in most countries due to growth in traffic volumes, increasing by 1% in the EU-27 between 2006 and 2007 alone.
Recent trends in CO2 emissions from transport are also expected to continue. The JRC estimates that GHG between 2000 and 2050 emissions from domestic transport in the EU-27 will increase by 24%, during which time emissions from road transport are projected to increase by 19% (JRC 2008) . On the basis of these trends 20 and expectations about the rate of technological and behavioural change, many studies have concluded that transport will be among the last sectors to bring its emissions down below current levels (Stern 2007, Annex 7c).
Indeed a review of 20 EU-wide and global scenario exercises concluded that total reduction potential of the sector by 2050 is generally less than 50% from 1990 levels, with the major share generally expected to come from technical solutions (Skinner et al. 2010) . Other studies have disputed this finding by demonstrating how the 25 combination of demand and supply side approaches and the adoption of small scale 'soft' measures are cost- effective routes to demand reduction in this sector (CfIT 2007; Anable 2008) . However, almost all studies conclude that the sector needs to adopt all the solutions at its disposal and more, both behavioral and technical, 'hard' and 'soft', if the transport sector is to avoid being responsible for jeopardizing EU emission reduction targets.
Since it is unlikely that transport agents will reduce their energy consumption and CO 2 emissions voluntarily, 5 policy interventions are necessary to ensure that the transport sector contributes to national and international emission targets. High emission reduction potentials exist in the transport sector, especially in road transport, through smaller and more fuel efficient vehicles and modal shift (BMU 2006 , Schäfer 2000 , and DeCicco and Ross 1996 . In Germany emission reductions of about 14 Mt CO 2e can be achieved cost effectively in the road transport sector (BDI 2007 the demand of alternative fuels, influencing modal split, as well as urban and land-planning strategies and traffic management systems. Whilst around 40% of Europe's GHG emissions are covered by the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the transport sector, with the exception of aviation from 2012, remains outside of the ETS.
Information tools, such as labeling and databases, support the user in making informed choices that have implications on the lifecycle costs of acquiring, owning and operating a vehicle. Fiscal and economic policies 20 include charges, taxes and financial support. Energy taxation 'punishes' consumption (and thus inefficiency and excessive usage), while fiscal tools and financial support (e.g. investment grants, accelerated depreciation, etc.) may be designed to improve the economics of technological solutions that may have higher upfront costs even if their lifecycle costs are lower. Infrastructure policies provide priority for efficient transport modes in the infrastructure (modal shift via the provision of cycle lanes, bus priority lanes, improved public transport services 25 and road space relocation, modal shift from road to rail in freight transport, parking policies). Spatial planning takes long-term effects in the transport system into account and gives instructions to the urban developers to optimize the regional transport system (with respect to public transport, urban densification, and car sharing etc.). Traffic and mobility management consider the middle-term perspective and optimize the utilization of the existing infrastructure by introducing GPS optimized congestion bypassing, optimized traffic routing, the provision of cycle lanes, bus priority lanes, improved bus services, road space reallocation, parking policies, and soft measures such as car sharing, information provision and travel planning. Voluntary action introduces voluntary commitments by market actors (e.g. car manufacturers) (UKERC 2007; UBA 2007 and CE Delft 2006) . In the authors' view cap-and-trade programs appear to be a very complex option for road transport 5 because covering a huge number of transport operators would impose huge administrative burden. Other authors -such as Raux (2010) -have put forward proposals for tradable rights for fuel consumption for personal travel, while acknowledging that these would involve high costs of implementation given the very large number of actors concerned.
In the last decade informational and voluntary instruments for transport sustainability are gaining importance: 10 these instruments are suggested in the "Three Pillar Approach", the first strategy of the European Commission to reduce CO 2 emissions in passenger road transport (EC 1995 reduced per-km vehicle operating costs -has been associated with a rebound effect of increased vehicle use thus requiring additional measures to effectively maintain real travel costs (Frondel et al. 2007 ). Goodwin et al. (2004) argue that the price-elasticity of total transport demand is negative, at about -0.6 in the long term, whereas the income-elasticity of transport fuel demand is much stronger with a positive value of about 1.2.
Consequently transport pricing policies and carbon taxation may require a much faster increase in the cost of 5 transport than in income, which has not been the effect of fuel taxation and carbon taxation policies to date.
Transport is a complex sector with a huge number of stakeholders and delivery channels involved. Hence, no policy instrument alone can ensure a significant and sustained effect -a balanced mix of instruments is needed to ensure the desired response, combining technological solutions and a rethink of demand (UKERC 2007; UBA 2007 and CE Delft 2006) .
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In this paper, we explore the introduction of energy saving obligations on transport fuel suppliers, following the logic of energy saving obligations on electricity and gas suppliers. Under existing energy saving obligations introduced in a number of EU countries (see the discussion in this paper), energy distributors or suppliers - 
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In this paper we first outline the principles of energy saving obligations, particularly white certificate schemes, as they exist in different EU member states, providing a brief comparative analysis of these. Bertoldi et al (2010) offers a comprehensive comparative analysis of the topic. Subsequently, in this paper we discuss the potential application of energy saving obligations and white certificates to the transport sector. The starting premises of the paper is that the potential attractiveness of such schemes in transport may come from their ability to circumvent problems of low price elasticity and high income elasticity of transport projects under a baseline-and-credit system. In the authors' view a stand-alone cap-and-trade systems for the transport sector are not applicable due to the large number of potential stakeholders involved, which is expected 15 to increase the administrative costs. Nevertheless, the paper does draw on research findings on capping transport emissions, which are relevant for the present work (for example in the context of the level for imposing savings targets).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a comparative review of the characteristics of energy saving obligations and Tradable White Certificate (TWC) schemes in Europe, pointing to the 20 implications of certain design choices. The descriptive review in sub-sections 2.1 to 2.3 is followed by a summary and analysis in sub-section 2.4. Section 3 introduces the authors' view on the possible modalities of energy saving obligations and TWC schemes in the transport sector and provides several design options. In Section 4 we discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the scheme. Section 5 concludes. A number of key design elements need to be examined in order to understand the potential for the application of energy saving obligations and TWC in the transport sector, to assess design options and to point to some of the complexities involved in the transport sector application. In the following paragraphs we outline how these 15 elements are currently resolved in the gas and electricity supplier obligations schemes and tradable certificate markets before looking in Section 3 at the possible design of energy saving obligations in the transport sector. Saving obligation should not be confused with a renewable fuel obligation, such as the biofuel sales requirement. 10 The fuel-standardisation is devised to ensure that the target units are directly related to the carbon emissions saved, irrespective of the fuel(s) concerned. reduction is not the only benefit of end-use energy efficiency.
White Certificate schemes: application fields in Europe

Size, unit and temporal content of the obligation
Whether to set a target in primary or final energy is a national choice, among others related to the decision 11 Note that in the case of electricity savings there is an overlap between the ETS and white certificate schemes: reduced electricity consumption due to the implementation of energy saving obligations free allowances for power producers. In Denmark the targets are set in the framework of a voluntary agreement. In the case of district heating, there is no voluntary agreement; instead every single district heating system has an executive order and has an individual target set.
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In Flanders individual targets are defined annually based on 2% of the amount of electricity supplied to household customers two years previously and 1.5% for the non-residential sector, i.e. the kWh distributed in the 12 Prior to the legislative changes in 2008, the threshold was set at 100,000 customers. As a result of this fairly high threshold, approximately one fifth of the total obligation in Italy was not been distributed, which corresponded to the volume of small suppliers. 
Eligible sectors and projects
At a third step, the regulator defines the types of projects and technologies eligible to generate savings towards the targets under the scheme. It needs to be re-emphasized here that there is a difference between the scope of 5 the obligation (which economic actors need to meet targets) and the scope of eligible sectors (where economic actors can implement projects that contribute towards the target). In Italy and France projects that deliver energy savings in transport can be certified, but as of 2009 there are no saving obligations on transport fuel suppliers.
The scheme can be completely open to account for savings from any technology, form of energy or end-use 10 sector, or it might be limited with respect to technologies (e.g. establishing a list of eligible project types), enduse sectors (e.g. limit projects to certain sectors) or energies (e.g. limit to grid-bound projects). However, the economic textbook argument is to not limit eligibility because this could lead to higher costs of compliance than if the market forces were left to determine the least-cost path to the environmental or social objective. 
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In the UK the supplier obligation has been introduced with the intention of, among other things, changing business models in energy supply. It has been observed that the major household energy suppliers have developed their own programs, used to some extent as a marketing tool. Nevertheless, energy efficiency programs have remained a separate operation from the core activity of selling energy units. Different is the situation in Italy, where the scheme has boasted the development of a market for energy efficiency services. In
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Italy the largest share of TWC -more than three quarters -has been issued to energy service providers. In
France, the majority of obliged parties have developed new services in the household energy market, such as advice, individual audits, financial instruments like low-interest rate loans and upfront subsidies. These build on partnerships with retailers, installers, manufacturers and banks. These partnerships have helped to structure and organize installation sector offers in the household sector. 
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Thirdly, whether certification of energy savings and certificate trading add value to supplier obligation depends on at least two major factors. Certificate trading can potentially contribute to increase in the cost-effectiveness of a supplier obligation scheme and make it a preferable option with respect to other policy instruments for energy saving (e.g. energy taxes) only when the energy saving target established is sufficiently high with respect to the existing saving potential in the sector(s) covered by the scheme. In general the more ambitious the saving target gets, and the more variation there is in energy saving unit-costs and end-use energy prices, the greater scope there is for a TWC scheme to outperform other energy policy instruments ).
The role of trading in a scheme that is limited in scope (e.g. residential sector only) is more ambiguous: the 5 additional administration cost of establishing and operating a trading regime may not justify the cost efficiency gains of trading for obliged parties and society. Since most suppliers work with a number of contractors and retailers, the implementation costs that different obliged parties pay are similar. However, there is considerable variation between energy suppliers in the mix of energy saving measures they employ to meet their targets.
Finally, in existing schemes the policy additionality of supplier obligation and TWC schemes has not been clear. These observations point to the idea that energy saving obligations and TWCs may have a role in the transport sector in order to bring together a combination of a mandate to deliver a certain amount of savings from cost-20 effective projects, a financing channel to (partially) cover the associated investment needs (cost recovery or pass through of costs to the end-user) and possibly the flexibility of compliance associated with certificate trading.
There are at least two major areas where the transfer of experience with existing energy saving obligations and TWC schemes to the implementation in the transport sector is expected to be of limited use. First, measurement and verification of energy savings from transport projects -including establishing baselines and adopting 25 methodologies for both technical and behavioral measures -is expected to pose difficulties due to the limited track record in measuring energy savings from transport in existing energy saving obligations and beyond.
Second, the implementation of the concept may need to be managed by another type of authority, not by the 17 Nevertheless, one needs to keep in mind that in France residential tariffs are regulated and there is no cost recovery: hence obliged parties are not passing on the costs in any standard way. energy regulator, as is mostly the case with existing schemes: unlike grid bound energies, transport fuels (with the exception of oil markets) are not regulated markets.
Technical/operational remarks
Based on the review and analysis of European schemes provided in the previous sections, the following lessons can be drawn about the design and operation of supplier and utility obligations and tradable certificate schemes 5 (Bertoldi et al. 2010 ):
• Supplier obligations encourage energy market actors into energy efficiency without necessarily changing their business models from selling energy into selling energy services, at least in the short term;
• Many design modalities -such as size of the saving potential in the sectors under obligation, the size 10 and nature of the obligation, the decision between annual or lifetime saving targets, obliged parties, sectoral and energy coverage, and the status of market liberalization -reflect national policy priorities;
• Supplier obligations and TWC schemes are well-suited to deliver low-cost and standard energy efficiency measures. Nevertheless, they can be designed to channel efforts towards measures with higher upfront investment needs (e.g. by using estimates of technical lifetimes of the measures or by 15 giving longer validity to certificates);
• Providing administrative and monitoring costs are not disproportionate in opening up the generation of TWCs to any party (not just the obligated energy companies), then this approach should theoretically ensure diverging marginal costs and lower risks of market power and speculative behavior. Allowing third parties to certify project savings is an opportunity to develop an energy services activity rather 20 than to constrain the obliged parties to evolve toward such activities;
• Obliged parties expect to recover the costs of compliance with the obligation in some way (cost recovery as in Italy or passing through in end-user prices as in the UK);
• • Minimum buy-out prices and penalties may act to establish a ceiling and a floor price. Banking of certificates or savings, long validity of certificates and long compliance periods mitigate price risks for obliged and eligible parties, but may discourage trading and thus reduce liquidity in the current compliance period;
• Administrative costs of all policy instruments are a function of the simplicity of the system and the ease 5 of obtaining reliable information necessary for its design and enforcement. The relatively low burden for the UK authority results from a single eligible sector (residential), rather limited number of obliged parties, ex-ante measurement and verification approach, as well as lack of third party trading provisions;
• Trading is expected to deliver cost efficiency gains when energy saving targets are set sufficiently high 10 with respect to the existing economic saving potential in the sectors covered by obligations. The more challenging the obligation is, the greater the benefit of trading as it brings diversity in the marginal costs of compliance among trading parties. The higher the target, the more likely it is that the obliged actors • The choice of primary or final energy influence the balance between savings on gas and electricity: for example in Italy, where obligations are in primary energy and lifetimes are set at 5 years (8 years in exceptional cases), most savings have occurred in electricity. Long lifetimes for certain measures and 25 the availability of standardized savings values for certain types of projects influence the compliance choices towards such projects or sectors.
• As in any market, an efficiently working tradable certificate market requires transparency i.e. that all players know the price of certificates in the market, the possibilities for the purchase and sale of 
Savings obligations and tradable certificates: possible applications in transport
In mid 2009 the first voluntary application of a scheme aiming to deliver energy savings in transport was 5 introduced in the UK. The details are outlined below. However, it needs to be emphasized that this application is more of a self-declaration or self-commitment to deploy a range of soft informative measures without a very clear mechanisms to deliver project-based energy savings. In contrast, the concept proposed in this paper is based on the concept of a mandatory energy saving target, possibility to recover compliance-related costs and trade project-based savings, and a non-compliance penalty charged.
10
In the UK the Department for Transport has developed a voluntary Energy Efficiency Agreement with road transport fuel suppliers to meet the requirements of the Energy Services Directive. The Agreement applies to anyone who sells road transport fuel to the end-user. This includes anyone who runs a petrol station, sells fuel from a pump, or who sells fuel through other sites such as bunkering sites or sells direct to businesses.
Companies that sign the agreement include major oil companies who own/run petrol stations, companies that run 15 franchised petrol stations, companies that run independent petrol stations, shops or garages with fuel pumps that are not purely for their own use, companies who sell fuel to companies such as bus operators, haulage companies, car fleets, etc., fuel card companies who own the fuel they manage.
In signing the agreement, companies agree to make sure that their customers have access to at least one fuel efficiency measure and to advertise/promote the measure(s) to their customers. Companies agree to make sure 20 their customers have access to the measures, and promote them, for at least 4 weeks every year. Evaluating the applicability of energy saving obligations and TWCs to the transport sector involves breaking down the potential 'system boundaries' into a number of elements as follows:
On which transport actor does the obligation fall?
In what unit would the obligation (reduction target) be expressed?
What types of projects would be allowed?
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Will it be ring fenced around transport fuels or linked with electricity and gas supplier obligations?
These issues are analyzed in the sections below.
Who are the obligated parties in the transport sector?
When defining the obligated parties in transport the link within the energy flow chain should be taken into 
Fuel producers (upstream)
An upstream system targeting fuel producers (i.e. oil refineries or fuel importers) would cover a manageable number of about 1 000 participants in the EU -likely to be high enough to ensure an efficient trading and low enough to be manageable to administer and monitor. The relevant data needed to design the obligation is already available as it is used for the national energy inventories or value-added tax. In the US the phase-out of lead in 5 gasoline is an example of successful implementation of upstream tradable permits to fuel quality standards 18 . In the EU, however, oil refineries are already under the EU ETS for their directly generated CO 2 emissions.
Because of this fact and due to their limited contact with final consumers, fuel producers are likely to have limited opportunity to implement energy efficiency projects and hence are considered inappropriate target for energy saving targets.
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Fuel distributors and suppliers (midstream)
Transport fuel distributors and suppliers, which distribute and retail fuels to final customers are positioned close to and have regular contact with the end user. While the own energy saving potential of fuel distributors and suppliers is doubtful, they are well-positioned to work with third parties (contractors) the way Italian electricity For all these reasons the authors of the paper believe that energy saving obligations should target fuel distributors and suppliers.
Car manufacturers (midstream)
A mid-stream system focused on car manufacturers is not deemed to be desirable because of already existing 25 tools and commitments (the 120g CO 2 /km target, car labelling, etc.) and because it is not expected that energy saving obligations and TWCs in this part of the chain will foster advances in vehicle technology. On the other hand, component suppliers can be allowed to certify energy savings resulting from their projects (e.g. tyres, 18 The lead rights trading program between refineries between 1982 and 1988 accelerated the phase-out of lead in gasoline until a complete ban came into effect in 1996 (Raux 2004) . lubricants, air condition etc.) and can receive compensation for doing so from economic actors under the transport obligation. This leads to an additional incentive for component suppliers to optimize the energy efficiency of their products.
Traffic participants (downstream)
In principle it would be possible to put obligations to save transport fuel on individual travelers and freight 5 operators, rather than suppliers. The obvious advantage is that it would directly incentivize users to invest in more efficiency vehicles and change their travel behavior, rather than acting via suppliers (Harwatt 2008; Raux and Marlot 2004) .
A downstream solution may be to put obligations on specific groups of transport fuel users who have good energy efficiency opportunities, such as freight transport operators. Introducing obligations for freight operators 10 has the advantages of economies of scale in terms of large savings per actor than passenger transport and of using existing reporting and bookkeeping of companies for monitoring and verification. Further, a downstream solution could be a combination of tolls (price instrument) and rationing rates (quantity instrument) or quotas for vehicle kilometers travelled within a given urban area for motorists that could be transferred among them, as an alternative to pure congestion pricing given the issue of acceptability (see Raux 2004 and sources herein). For 15 example, vehicle owners can be provided with an amount of free units ('rights' to purchase fuel). If they need to go beyond the allowance provided, they must pay. At the same time those who spare some of the initially distributed rights may be allowed to return them to obtain either a monetary or fiscal transfer ('subsidy') (Frisoni 2007) . Raux (2004) shows examples that it is technically possible to apply a quota-based system of permits to mobile sources within a defined area with a small number of readily controllable points of entry and exit.
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Yet, the administrative costs of such a downstream system -that resembles personal carbon trading -could be significant as a huge number of transport operators would need to be placed under the obligation in order to ensure adequate coverage.
3.2
Stand-alone scheme or integrated? introduction under an energy saving obligation and TWC scheme on grid-bound energies may produce very limited results in terms of implementing transport projects.
For these reasons we recommend, at least in an initial phase, a "closed" national stand-alone obligation limited only to transport sector projects (excluding aviation) rather than an open system where transport obliged parties could also obtain certificates in electricity and gas savings. A midstream system with obligations imposed on 5 fuel distributors and suppliers and expressed in savings in amount of fuel can act as a pilot test for the concept. The system could co-exist with taxation: the tax will be paid by market actors that, due to their small size, are outside the obligations and by obliged parties who fail to meet their targets and fail to purchase certificates in the form of sanctions, which acts as a ceiling on certificate price (see also Raux and Marlot 2004) .
In what units would the obligation be expressed? 10
The energy saving obligations are specified either in absolute terms (in tons of CO 2 or MWh saved) or relative to energy sales at the start of the timeframe. Energy saving obligations started off being applied to primary energy (through the Energy Efficiency Commitment, whose predecessor -the Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance is the oldest supplier obligation in Europe) and changed to carbon (e.g. Carbon Emissions
Reduction Target in the UK), thus moving from a focus on merely energy efficiency to incorporating more 15 innovation including fuel switching incentives.
The obligation on the transport sector might be focused on primary energy (litres of fuel), carbon, fuel efficiency of cars, fuel efficient driving of traffic participants, vehicle mileage travelled, passenger or tonne kilometres, air pollutants, biofuels etc. Renewable fuel projects might be allowed too. When choosing the unit of obligation a few factors need to be taken into consideration. First, the nature of the policy aim pursued, i.e. is it 20 an operative aim (e.g. traffic avoidance, mode shift and traffic guidance) or a strategic aim (e.g. mobility needs, transport security, economic profitability, vulnerability of energy supply, environmental aspects, and generating revenues)? Second, the ease of monitoring compliance. Finally, the adequacy of targets imposed at different levels in terms of expected results, energy saving potential and the acceptance of targets by different actors.
Allocation criteria are needed to apportion the sectoral target into individual ones. In mid-or downstream 25 system, an allocation according the historic volumes of distributed energy within the last year(s) might be a straightforward solution. A further option would be the allocation according the number of served customerswhich may however be complicated in road transport.
3.4
Which types of projects to allow and how to cover the costs of compliance? A crucial step in the development of energy saving targets is the identification of the eligible energy saving measures that would be implemented to comply with obligations. As discussed in section 3.2, the authors of this paper argue that, at least initially, energy saving obligations in the transport sector should be kept separate from general energy saving obligations on energy suppliers rather than extending energy suppliers obligations to cover transport distributors and suppliers. In addition, only transport projects should count towards energy 5 saving obligation in the transport sector.
This is recommended in order to target hard-to-reach energy efficiency and energy savings from the transport sector, where barriers are strong and price elasticities are low. In addition, market distortions may occur if putting under the obligation both market actors subject to some form of price regulations (e.g. electricity and gas tariffs in the residential sectors in some countries) and market actors that are not subject to such price regulations 2. Developing lower carbon fuels. The improvement of the energy mix for electric cars and the 25 development of "second generation" biofuels (by Fischer-Tropsch gas-to-liquids technology) are promising alternatives to fossil fuels. Currently, the carbon emission reduction potential is however still limited (Larivé et al., 2004; Bringezu et. al. 2009 ).
3. Increasing the efficiency with which vehicles are used (occupancy rates and driving style). In passenger transport, occupancy rates can be improved through car sharing and on-road fuel efficiency 30 However, Information Communication Technology (ICT) systems can make journeys both more efficient (shorter -e.g. through GPS based systems) and through tele-initiatives such as teleworking, video conferencing and home shopping to spatial planning for new housing and business developments.
There is however a long discussion about the rebound effect of these techniques: e.g. through video 15 conferences it is possible to communicate with many people all over the world, which might lead to further working meetings (see among others Choo et al., 2005) .
The project types listed above deserve some further consideration also in the light of possible implementing parties (obliged and eligible actors). First and foremost, it needs to be emphasized that energy saving obligations are intended to foster market transformation and uptake of commercially viable technologies via cost effective 20 projects rather than to deliver technological advancements, which are better targeted by regulation and policies to support research and development. In addition, vehicle technology has been subject to numerous incentives in various member states of the EU, among other as part of support measures to deal with the financial crisis.
Second, it is deemed appropriate to place fuel suppliers or distributors under obligation due to their proximity to the end user and the ability to recover the cost of obligation via a small charge on each liter of fuel sold (see next   25 paragraph), but allow both them and also other economic actors without obligations -referred to as 'eligible actors' under energy saving obligation and TWC schemes -to certify savings from projects they implement. In terms of delivery channels obliged companies can offer soft measures, such as information about smart driving, car loading and tyre pressure. They can also provide public transport incentives (e.g. free bus tickets) or offer a price discount on more efficient fuels. Eligible actors may include road haulage companies, taxi companies, 30 public transport companies, transport energy service companies, but also car manufacturers, tyre manufacturers and car repair chains. Each of these eligible actors -and many more -can offer various delivery channels.
The authors recommend financing the cost of the project implementation up to the level of the obligation for each subject via a cost-recovery mechanism financed by a small fixed charge on each liter of fuel sold intended to cover project costs (cost recovery). An alternative may be to allow each supplier to increase fuel price to pass 5 through its costs of compliance (pass through). Loss of fuel sales should not be subject to any cost recovery mechanism.
It has been observed that the effectiveness of energy saving obligations and TWCs applied in the electricity and gas sectors increases if they are bundled with other policy instruments such as information campaigns and other means to promote opportunities of energy saving to drive the consumers demand for energy efficient measures -10 even though this contradicts the pure economic theory. The introduction of the TWC scheme into a market leads to an increased demand for energy efficient goods by lowering their relative price. However, the impact on consumption may be limited. This is due to the rebound effect on the consumer behavior 19 . Measures which target behavioral choices could help to lock in savings and limit such losses. A further concern is that short-term elasticity of transport fuel use, as complemented with durable equipment (vehicles), is much smaller than long-15 term elasticity (Goodwin et al. 2004 ). 19 Energy efficiency measures in transport lead to the reduction in cost per unit of distance travelled. This can lead in turn result in more travel, the purchase of larger cars and a corresponding increase in fuel consumption and emissions (UKERC 2007 and Frondel et al. 2007 ). The UK Energy Research Centre estimates that in the case of transport, the direct effect of the rebound is likely to cause a loss of emissions savings of around 10 % (UKERC 2007). In the longer term, the indirect economy-wide effect, which includes embodied energy from new technologies, is likely to be higher. 20 The deemed savings target bus driver training, energy efficient tires, vehicles running on cleaner fuels and recuperation on braking. Finally, non-compliance to meet energy saving obligations either via own action, working with third parties or purchasing certified energy savings, should result in a penalty. The size of the penalty can be pre-defined (as in France) in order to establish a ceiling in the costs of compliance or linked to the average cost of compliance of all market actors (e.g. based on average certificate price). To increase the opportunity cost of non-compliance, the penalty funds can be recycled as award to complying parties.
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Discussion
The present paper is intended to open a wider discussion and analysis of energy saving obligations and TWCs in the transport sector. This discussion will be timely in the light of the expected inclusion of transport fuel suppliers under the French energy saving obligation and given that a first attempt to engage transport fuel suppliers in energy efficiency has been introduced on voluntary terms in the UK.
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The authors of this paper deem transport fuel distributors and suppliers to be the most appropriate parties on which to impose energy saving obligations. The obligation could be imposed on fuel suppliers above a certain threshold of annual sales. Concerning the scope of eligible projects, limiting projects to those in the transport sector, at least initially, will foster much needed energy and emission savings in this sector. This is the case even if this may result in higher economic costs of implementing a stand-alone transport scheme than an integrated 15 scheme of energy saving obligations and TWCs where the obligated parties can implement projects and buy
certificates from other end-use sectors. The authors recommend financing the cost of the project implementation up to the level of the obligation for each subject via a cost-recovery mechanism financed by a small fixed charge on each liter of fuel sold.
Energy saving obligations have the potential to offer a number of advantages over other tried policy tools in the 20 transport sector. Given the ever-increasing importance of transport in environmental and energy security terms, energy saving obligations may be an efficient alternative to taxation. As a baseline-and-credit system, energy saving obligations and TWC schemes work by rewarding projects that improve the efficiency of transportation and deliver savings, rather than based on penalizing consumption the way a tax does.
Energy saving obligations and TWCs offer certainty of outcomes 21 , theoretical cost minimization and the 25 possibility for many economic subjects to benefit. The obligation compels economic actors to either directly implement efficiency projects (or energy saving projects) or to buy the certificates from other eligible market 21 Assuming full compliance and no rebound effect actors. Such an arrangement would allow economic parties to certify energy savings and sell certificates without being under an obligation: for instance freight haulage companies may employ efficient solutions (GPS, modal shift, etc.), certify their actions and sell the associated certificates.
The major expected barriers to the introduction of energy saving obligations and TWCs in transportation include high administrative costs especially for the first country introducing this policy portfolio and, more importantly, 5 introducing measurement and verification methodologies to capture actual energy savings, especially for behavioral projects. Administrative costs concern the development of measurement and verification methodologies, cost of administrating and monitoring the scheme, including certificates registry and the market set up if the certificates are tradable. In addition, it may be difficult to establish an appropriate implementing authority: unlike grid bound energies, transport fuels (with the exception of oil markets) are not regulated.
Finally, while a comprehensive comparative review or review of interactions between fuel savings obligations and other tools is outside the scope of the present paper, a few issues need to be emphasized here. First of all, in tackling the demand side of the transport sector, savings targets appear more effective and, more importantly, much more result-oriented than energy taxation due to the low price-elasticity of transport demand. Thus, for a tax to bring genuine savings, it needs to be set a relatively high level, which may politically difficult. In contrast, 
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As already mentioned, many issues related to the introduction of TWCs are similar to the discussion of CO 2 emissions cap-and-trade systems in transport and are mainly based on public acceptability issues (among others) (CE-Delft 2006 and Harwatt 2008) . Public acceptability and high transaction and monitoring costs are expected to be key barriers to the implementation of a TWC scheme in the transport.
Conclusions
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This paper marks some initial efforts to explore the possible use of saving obligations and TWCs in the transport sector and to encourage further research on this topic. The authors have looked at the importance for sustainable transport policies on the demand side and examined possibilities for setting energy saving obligations on various transport market operators. Types of eligible projects have been discussed, as well as types of market actors eligible to certify project savings without being under an obligation.
At this point the authors recommend a system with energy saving obligations imposed on fuel distributors and 5 suppliers above a certain level of annual sales. It is proposed that the system is limited to the transport sector, with only transport projects allowed and with non-obliged actors also eligible to certify savings achieved, such as car manufacturers, public authorities, logistic companies, tyre manufacturers, car hire companies, taxi companies, public transport companies, road haulage companies, and a possible new business -the transportation energy service company -able also to finance a savings package and give energy performance 10 guarantees. The system can have a cost-recovery element, financed by a fund raised by an additional and small charge on fuel sold.
The authors tend to believe that savings obligations and TWCs could achieve better results compared to other transport policies discussed or implemented, such as taxation and CO 2 caps. They are also well suited to complement other important policies.
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The authors hope that this paper will open a discussion between TWC experts, transport sector professionals and policy makers on the feasibility and advantages of this policy instrument, and on its possible implementation characteristics. The authors see energy saving obligations and TWCs as an additional cost-effective policy instrument that is expected to complement and strengthen existing policy tools in the sector, rather than replace them, with the ultimate aim to reverse the growth in transport energy consumption in the EU. Finally, the authors 20 believe that any further work on the topic should focus on measurement and verification methods for transport efficiency, provide a comparative qualitative evaluation of energy saving obligations and TWCs in the transport sector and other well-established tools (such as taxation), and possibly attempt a quantitative assessment of the scheme, including of the effects from the interactions with other policies. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
